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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have be previously ascertained by law, and to be the informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
Article I Section 12, Utah State Constitution. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right.. . to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, . . . 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rile in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
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Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Does sufficient evidence exist to bind the case over to trial from the 
preliminary hearing stage. The defendant challenged the use of hearsay as unreliable 
and also as a denial of his constitutional right to confront witnesses. 
Defendant's initial objection to hearsay was made at the preliminary 
hearing. His objections were overruled. Thereafter, defendant filed a formal 
motion to 'Quash the Bind over'. This motion was denied also. See addendum. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant appeals from a criminal conviction of 'Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance', a second-degree felony. 
The defendant sought a dismissal of the information and an order quashing 
the 'bind-over' from the preliminary hearing. This motion was denied. The 
defendant entered a "Sery Plea" to the charge, reserving his right to challenge the 
conviction on appeal. Defendant argues that the State's evidence is insufficient and a 
denial of his right to confront witnesses. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The defendant was accused of 'Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance', a second-degree felony. The date of offense is July 31, 1999. It is second 
count in the original information. The remaining counts were dismissed. 
The preliminary hearing was conducted in the Justice of the Peace for Sanpete 
County on February 22, 2000. At the hearing, the State called only one witness, a 
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Deputy Sheriff Clark Thomas for San Pete County and a member of the Central Utah 
Narcotic's Task Force. Mr. Thomas simply read his police report containing 
information from a undisclosed confidential informant and others. 
Officer Thomas reported that on July 31, 1999, he was conducting a narcotic 
investigation in Mt. Pleasant City, Utah (T.9 L.10-11). A confidential informant had 
contacted Thomas and informed him that he had a prior conversation with Mitchell 
Hill. The informant advised Thomas that he had arranged for Mitchell and his 
brother Jeremy to transport to Mt. Pleasant one-half ounce of methamphetamine. T.9 
L. 18-20. Police did not monitor this conversation. The only source for this data is the 
informant. 
Shortly thereafter, a monitoring device was then placed on the informant. 
(T.9 L. 22-24). The anticipated meeting between Hill and the informant never took 
place. T. 10 L. 1. 
Defendant upon cross-examination sought the name of the confidential 
informant who reportedly advised Thomas of the prior discussions. T. 13 L.3. The 
State objected to disclosing the informant's name and advised that they may do so in 
the future. The magistrate sustained the objection by the State and refused to have 
Thomas disclose the informant's name. T.13 L. 7-18. Defendant requested the 
Court adjourn the hearing and continue it until the informant could be disclosed. T. 
19 L. 24 - T.20 L. 1-2. The Court refused and continued with the preliminary 
hearing. T.20 L.3. 
Defendant continued his cross-examination. T.23. The informant apparently 
called Mr. Thomas in the morning hours of July 31, 1999. T.23 L. 8. The informant 
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had discussions between himself and Mr. Mitchell Hill. Again, the source for this 
information is only the informant. 
However, Thomas did monitor, in part, the informant's second conversation 
with Mitchell Hill via a transmitter. Deputy Thomas was able to listen to the 
informant's portion of the phone conversation but not Mr. Mitchell Hill. T.25 L. 10-
13;T.5L.18. 
Mr. Thomas was asked if he could recall the conversation between Mr. Hill 
and the informant and he testified: "No, not word for word". T. 23 L. 13; T.23 L. 19 
;T. 25 L. 4-9. The officer admits that he may or may not have been able to hear the 
conversation between Mitchell Hill (via the phone) and the informant ( T.25 L. 16-
17) or to Jeremy Hill. T.23 L.19. The officer was listening only to the informant's 
portion of the phone conversation. 
No laboratory results were presented finding the substance to be 
methamphetamine. T.23 L. 22. However, the officer was fairly confident that he was 
present when a field test was conducted on the substance but that others tested the 
substance. He believed the substance to be methamphetamine. Neither field tests nor 
formal testing were introduced. T.24 L. 4-5. 
Defendant argues that at the preliminary hearing the officer did nothing more 
than to take the stand and read the police report. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendant is entitled to confront the witnesses against him. This right 
applies to all 'critical stages' of a criminal prosecution. Under the Utah statutory 
scheme, the preliminary hearing is a critical stage. The Court may even dismiss the 
charge lacking a finding of probable cause. 
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Here the State failed to present the critical witness to sustain their accusation. 
The substance of the State's charge rested on communications between the State's 
witness and the defendant and his brother. The State never called the witness at the 
preliminary hearing. The State called only one witness, a Deputy Thomas, who 
essential read his police report to the Court refusing to disclose the name of the 
Informant. 
The defendant asserts that his right to confront witnesses was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF BOTH THE UTAH AND 
FEDERAL CONSTITION APPLIES TO PRELIMINARY HEARINGS 
The Confrontation Clause of both the Utah State Constitution and the United 
States Constitution is broader than the hearsay rule of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The admission of testimonial evidence may fall within an exception to the hearsay 
rule, yet violate the constitutional right to confront witnesses. The critical inquiry is 
whether the values embodied in the confrontation clause are impinged upon by the 
admission of the hearsay and, if so, whether there are adequate safeguards to protect 
those values. State v. Webb, (1989 Utah) 779 P2d 1108. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed issue in State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 
(Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court found the right of confrontation to be 
fundamental; guarded both by the federal and state constitutions. The Court found: 
"Simply because testimony of extra judicial statements might be 
admissible under the hearsay exception does not mean that those 
statements automatically pass constitutional muster. If the 
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evidence violates a defendant's right to confront witnesses, it 
should not be admitted." (Emphasis Added) 
The Court found the right does not exist to all statements admitted by 
an absentee witness at trial. The inquiry shifts to the extent of the violation. 
Is the violation significant or merely a technical argument lending little to the 
fact-finding process? The Court then made a two-prong analysis: 
"First, we look at whether the State's presentation of 
hearsay testimony of extra judicial statements or occurrences 
is "crucial" to the State's case or "devastating" to the 
defendant. 
Second, we look at the availability of the declarant and 
whether the presence of the declarant will add any probative 
value to the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to observe 
the demeanor of the witness." 
In Moosman, the Utah Supreme Court found the violation not 
substantial and affirmed the conviction. In essence, the Court found the admission of 
declarant's statement was so insubstantial that it did not mandate reversal. 
In Moosman, the Utah Supreme Court cites Reardon v. Manson, 806 
F.2d 39 (2nd Cir. 1986) cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1989). The Reardon court found 
the confrontation clause is not necessarily violated by the prosecution's failure to 
produce a hearsay declarant for cross-examination where the "utility of the trial 
confrontation" would be remote and of little value to either the jury or the defendant. 
See first prong of the Moosman case. 
Nevertheless, both the United States Supreme Court and Utah case law have 
recognized the importance of confrontation when the State attempts to introduce the 
statements of co-defendants. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Richardson 
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v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987); State v. Kendricks. 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1979) and State 
v. Travis, 541 P.2d 797 (Utah 1975) requiring a co-defendant's statements to be 
excluded unless the co-defendant was present and subject to effective cross-
examination. 
In Bruton and Richardson state that the right of confrontation is fundamental 
and a violation of this right requires reversal. In Bruton, the conviction was reversed 
due to statements of a co-defendant being introduced when the co-defendant was not 
present at trial and subject to cross-examination. In Richardson, the Court allowed a co-
defendant' admission into evidence as long as the statement was not incriminating the 
other defendant. See Kendrick and Travis for similar holdings of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Defendant argues that a violation of his right to confront witnesses occurred at 
the preliminary hearing. The violation was not merely technical but went to the 
substance of the State's case. The "arranging for the distribution of a controlled 
substance" was based on the communications between the informant and Mitchell Hill 
with his brother Jeremy being an accomplice. Thomas was not privy to these 
discussions. Thomas reports that the informant told him about the arrangement in the 
morning and Deputy Thomas hears only the one-sided phone conversation between the 
informant and Mitchell Hill. It is on these discussions that the arranging charge stands 
and Jeremy Hill was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the informant. 
There was no opportunity to expose weaknesses in the State's case that may 
cause the magistrate to dismiss the case. No effective interrogation of the informant 
was available to fashion an impeachment tool for trial. Defendant could not explore or 
develop favorable testimony to his defense. He was denied the opportunity to use the 
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preliminary hearing as a discovery device to explore the State's case against him and to 
prepare a proper defense to meet that case at trial. He could not make preparation of a 
proper defense to meet that case at the trial. 
Utah case law requires the exclusion of a known co-defendant's testimony at 
trial. State v. Kendrick , supra; State v. Travis, supra. Defendant argues that both 
Federal and Utah case law requires the exclusion of known co-defendant's statements at 
trial. The defendant submits that the State cannot use statement of a hidden and 
unknown informant's alleged statements at the preliminary hearing. 
DOES THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT APPL YA T THE 
PRELIMINAR YHEARING STAGE? 
Effective January 1995, an amendment to Art. I Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution was made. It provides as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r igh t . . . to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, . . . 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
(Emphasis Added) 
Arguably, the amendments to the Utah State Constitution may modify the right 
to confront witnesses under Utah Constitutional law. However, the state amendment 
does not modify the Federal Constitution which provides as follows: 
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have be previously ascertained by law, and to be the informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. (Emphasis Added). 
In defining the preliminary hearing, Utah Courts have consistently held: 
The purpose of the right to a preliminary hearing is to secure to the 
accused, before he is brought to trial under an information, the right to be 
advised of the nature of the accusation against him and to be confronted 
with and given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses testifying on 
behalf of the State. State v. Sommers. 597 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Utah 1979); State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995). 
The United State Supreme Court has found the Sixth Amendment to be 
applicable to the States at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. In U.S. v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct 1926, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), the Supreme Court held that an 
accused was entitled to the presence of counsel at any stage of the prosecution, formal 
or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's 
right to a fair trial. 
In Coleman v. Alabama. 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed 2d 387 (1969) the 
Court found that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage in Alabama's criminal 
process and thereby required an indigent defendant to have counsel at this critical stage 
(as at the trial itself). Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). See also Powell v. 
Alabama. 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932); Pointer v. Texas. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Alabama's 
preliminary hearing is essentially the same as Utah's. 
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The Utah Supreme Court previously dealt with this same issue in State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). Reviewing both Federal and State law, the 
Court found that the preliminary hearing is a 'critical stage' in the criminal prosecution 
and that the right of confrontation is guaranteed under Art. I. Section 12 of the Utah 
State Constitution. 
In Anderson, the defendant was accused of tampering with a witness. The 
defendant Anderson was the Chief of Police in Soldier Summit and the co-defendant 
Brackenbury was Justice of the Peace. Both Anderson and Brackenbury went to the 
tavern to investigate the suspected illegal sale of alcohol. 
In the saloon, a confrontation ensued between Anderson and Gamer, the 
manager of the saloon. During the confrontation, a patron/bouncer of the saloon, 
Applegate, came to the aide of Gamer. Upon learning that Anderson was the Chief of 
Police, he returned to his original place at the end of the bar. The confrontation 
escalated and ended with Gamer striking Anderson in the face. Anderson advised 
Garner that he was under arrest. Anderson then left the saloon to enjoin the aide of 
assisting officer Curtis. Brackenbury then left the saloon and returned to his trailer 
which also served the Justice Court. Anderson and Curtis then returned to the saloon 
and forcibly detained Gamer. In the ensuing scuffle, Gamer was thrown to the floor, 
handcuffed and removed. Curtis took Garner to jail. 
Anderson then returned to the saloon and arrested Applegate, taking him to 
Brackenbury's trailer. Once inside the trailer, Brackenbury proclaimed the Justice Court 
to be in session. Anderson then proceeded to physically intimidate Applegate into 
signing false statements concerned Garner striking Anderson and Applegate's purchase 
of liquor from Gamer. Applegate advised later that he signed the statements in fear of 
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furtne: violence. Deputy Curtis corroborated Applegate ^ account or the incident and 
advised that Anderson admitted to roughing up Annlesate 
A> lU • ' , • \ •.. .:u- -AciLJ presented as witnesses. 
however, iiu pioNceutioi: instead of presenting Applegate at the preliminary hcarav 
move to introduce Applegan/^ sv--MT. affidavit rc: I :T . ' * 
1
 r ' ^ •• - . . , .., > !v..i:Miiu ar.v. 'A\L ai^nvenience of bringing him i > 
. am ;endeR„ m^ absence permissible \t tua.. P )th defendants were convicted. 
• The Anderson Court went inv : ' a ia - i »• ^aaaiaance 
i't Ihi' iit'jil l i in. Inn in in aiingin uaihand Jocund OI \\:K-tne: tin confrontation 
right is necessary to insure the protection of any substantive rights of the accused. 
The Court concluded that t»w m.-invnn.us hearing in Utah is a critical stage in 
m i . ._L\^  anc c; :;aa; ph>a\iuiai safeguards are recognized as necessary to 
guarantee the accused's substantive rights to a fan hearing F N ' ~ . " • • * .f 
the fundamental purpose - • '-?• • pL :>, - ;- > ;vk:it ; . - - ^ aw. a- '•/ s 
a protection afforded the accused to relieve him. of the substantial degradation and 
expense incident to a modern criminal mai where *he evide»- ie 
charges unwarrana* • o_ .H:IK natuit . r the accusation 
of the charges again a ;,;. • ,u-e also State v. Jensen, 34 * ; ;-• ^P L>o P !0S5 » -^08). 
The Anderson Court, reviewing the Federal Sixth * **i • dmen* . ; •-
U.S. v. Wade, ^ '° f ' ' „ v 967) applying the Sixth 
Amendment protections to all critical stages of the criminal process. The Anderson 
Court further cited Coleman v.. Alabama. ^0C) ! ' '- . :a ,F.; \ ! 
^
M
° - : ,. ^ : a !L .iions or inr ^xm AnK-iuimeni inght to counsel) to the 
accused at the preliminary hearing stage. 
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The Coleman Court found that the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing 
(referencing the Right to Confrontation) was essential to the accused's protection 
against erroneous or improper prosecution, and stating: 
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may 
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in 
any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced 
lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-
examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve 
testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who doesn't appear 
at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the 
case the State has against his client and make possible preparation of 
a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. 
The Anderson Court found that the introduction of certain material testimony, 
albeit admissible under the hearsay exemption , would seriously curtail the defendant's 
ability to present an affirmative defense at the preliminary hearing; denying him the 
protections provided by the confrontation of witnesses. 
Most recently in State v. Clark. 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 2001), the Utah Supreme 
Court, cited approvingly State v. Anderson. The Court found that the preliminary 
hearing is not a trial per se but not a ex parte proceeding and not a one-side 
determination of probable cause. The Court found that an accused is granted a 
statutory right to cross-examine the witnesses against him with attendant rights to 
subpoena and present witnesses in his defense. State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 2001) 
at page 306,footnote 3. The Court however noted the amendment to Art. I Section 12 
and Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) allowing the admission of reliable hearsay. 
(*Note State v.Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995), see footnote 4, which 
implied that the United States Supreme Court held that the protection afforded criminal 
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defendants by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause did not extend to 
preliminary" hearings. The L \nm cited ~v re tire n. e uerste<;< > , dgh * 
Jnn • "^  s ("- \^-' * . - iiowcici. the Gerstein decision dealt with ru " -
dJ\ ersaridl bail hearings ana not preliminary hearings (as Utah V and Alabama *s). 
Gerstein found the Fourth Amendment C^K S-\*U - 7 -: ...;.L7.:. .<cu :::>.nation of 
pioha^le CJI.~ . , - c L\. . •* .w to extended restraints of liberty following arrest. The 
Court in State v. Clark found preliminary" hearings to be adversarial where an 
opportunity exists for the charges to be dismissed.) 
"I >n : . .::. vmciidiiKTxt is applicable to all critical stages of the criminal 
prosecut ion and more particularly to Utah ' s preliminary hearings. Coleman, v. 
Alabama,supra; Powell v. Aiabam»* ... ^.^. \. w que,supra. State v. Anderson, 
^v'*1- -:uate v. Clark. 
APPLICATION TO THIS C A Si 
Here. •* , v.,if< • / ' -• ' homas. He essentially read 
::. police repair. He provided testimony regarding conversations by an unnamed, 
iK n disclosed confidential informant. Over nbiecn^n * n . • : 
refused to co - * .nrormant. u- . -,T iefu>ed 10 continue 
UK rearing until MICI: time as the informant could be disclosed and obviously denied 
tht defendant access to this potential witness. 
'
:
 - - - - • i.i s . present a laboratory result on the substance 
IIIL _>tate believed to be metnamphetamine. The office? believed that someone 
field test on it but he w ^ w^r \- 'I h- •r exchange of 
n a i r n f i ^ fni Miniit'v IL ; _ _ ; <n ^latuiients made o\ dn undisclosed informant. 
Wi th the informant hidden, the defendant was denied a significant 01 
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meaningful preliminary hearing. He could not bring the weaknesses (fatal or 
otherwise) in the State's case to light, which may have lead the magistrate to dismiss 
the case. He had no ability to fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-
examination of the State's witness at trial. He could not preserve testimony favorable 
to his defense of a witness who did not appear. He could not effectively discover the 
State's case, essentially negating any preparation of a possible defense at the trial. In 
essence, he was denied his right to a preliminary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears fairly evident that the preliminary hearing was not much more than 
'sham'; filling the need of a preliminary hearing mandated by statute. The officer 
essentially did nothing more than hand in his police report to the defendant and the 
Court. 
The substance of the State's accusation exists in the testimony of the 
informant who remains unknown and hidden. It delegates to the police the ability to 
secret witnesses and essentially deny the defendant's right to confront witnesses. It 
further denies the accused of the right to a meaningful preliminary hearing and 
thereby effective assistance of counsel. 
DATED this S day of August, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM 
1 District Court Ruling Denying Motion to Quash Bindovci. 
IVI^ I I_ . I \O C h R i i H i . r \ i E 
I hereby certify thar T mailed a copy of motion and order to extend time to file 
appellant's brief toi 
Attorney General for the State of Utah (four copies) 
1
 :4 State Capitol 
baa Lake City, Utah 841 14 
T T
^h Court of Appeals (eighth copies) 
^ -:rh State 
Salt I ake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Postage prepaid this _H[ day of August, 2001 
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE CO 
160 North Main Street 
Manti, UT 84642 
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Jeremie Edward Hill, 
Defendant. 
Order Denying Motion to Quash Bindover 
Case No. 991600115 
Assigned Judge: K. L. Mclff 
Defendant objects to the use of hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing held herein, 
but fails to establish how the purposes of the preliminary hearing have been defeated. In essence 
defendant objects to the overall approach to conducting preliminary hearings which is now firmly 
rooted in Utah's constitutional, statutory, and case law as well as applicable rules of evidence. 
The State is obliged to respond to reasonable discovery requests and to disclose the identity and 
anticipated testimony of witnesses sufficiently in advance of trial to allow proper preparation by 
the defense. This procedure is best suited to address the concerns expressed by defendant. 
Defendant's motion to quash the bindover is accordingly denied. 
Dated this Q day of July, 2000. 
K. L. Mclff 
District Court Judge 
